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ORGANIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ROBERT C. BIRD* 
STEPHEN KIM PARK** 
Abstract: A publicly-held corporation maintains a system of governance 
through separation of ownership and control of the firm. Under this framework, 
corporations attract capital and repatriate profits to their shareholders under the 
authority vested in the board of directors. However, significant evidence exists 
that Chief Executive Officers (“CEOs”) are commonly driven by self-interest, 
boards often indulge CEOs, and shareholders find it difficult to monitor man-
agement. Many recent reforms have sought to improve corporate governance 
through regulatory interventions that empower shareholders. This Article identi-
fies the limitations of this approach and advances a new model that looks within 
the “black box” of the firm. Integrating legal analysis with insights from organi-
zational management and finance scholarship, this Article argues that corpora-
tions can overcome weak governance practices through forces that are driven by 
self-interested behavior of internal corporate actors. Three distinct, yet interre-
lated, internal forces generate what this Article calls organic corporate govern-
ance: (1) compliance systems that establish and enforce internal rules of con-
duct, (2) firm-specific human capital that binds actors to the firm, and (3) mutu-
al monitoring by superiors and subordinates that constrains the self-interested 
behavior that erodes firm value. This Article applies this model to the responsi-
bilities of the Chief Legal Officer (“CLO”), also known as the firm’s general 
counsel, who is an indispensable generator of organic corporate governance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance scholarship remains in constant conflict in part 
because our understanding of how corporations are optimally governed is 
incomplete. In spite of decades of scholarly debate,1 including thousands of 
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 1 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent 
Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 914 (1982) (characteriz-
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articles in the past ten years alone,2 there is no consensus about the optimal 
role of corporate governance in the firm. Under predominant views, a corpo-
ration is monitored by the board of directors and managed on a day-to-day 
basis by the CEO and other members of senior management. These actors are 
then ultimately accountable to shareholders.3 However, substantial schisms 
remain over fundamental questions such as the propriety of executive com-
pensation,4 the use of corporate governance ratings,5 and the relative primacy 
                                                                                                                           
ing the corporate governance literature as “voluminous” and noting its role in fueling the “wide-
spread perception that there is something ‘wrong’ with the way corporations are governed”); Pat-
rick J. Ryan, Corporate Directors and the “Social Costs” of Takeovers—Reflections on the Tin 
Parachute, 64 TUL. L. REV. 3, 35 n.95 (1989) (calling the corporate governance literature “exten-
sive” and citing representative works from the 1970s and 1980s). More recently, even sub-
literatures of corporate governance are now considered to be populated with large quantities of 
research. See, e.g., Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Govern-
ance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 61, 88 n.130 
(1999) (referring to “[t]he literature discussing the role of institutional investors in corporate gov-
ernance in the U.S.” as “voluminous”); Brett H. McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Govern-
ance—Possible, but Not Desirable, 47 VILL. L. REV. 341, 345 n.15 (2002) (remarking that the 
literature on convergence in the context of corporate governance is “fairly extensive and growing 
rapidly”). Early debates date back to the 1930s. Compare A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as 
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) (discussing the appropriate duties of the board of 
directors), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1932) (commencing the Berle-Dodd debate on the appropriate duties of the board of 
directors). 
 2 Alicia J. Davis, The Institutional Appetite for “Quack Corporate Governance,” 2015 COL-
UM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 & n.15. The author conducted a search on Westlaw for law review articles 
containing the term “corporate governance” at least five times anywhere in the article. Id. The 
result produced 2845 articles, a figure that does not include the substantial number of articles 
written by finance, management, and other business scholars. Id. Performing a similar search for 
the ten years prior to January 20, 2017, yields 2656 articles. Westlaw Search with “Corporate 
Governance” at Least Five Times, WESTLAWNEXT, http://westlawnext.com (last visited Jan. 
20, 2017) (search in “advanced: (ATLEAST5 (“corporate governance”)) & DA(aft 01-20-2007 & 
bef 01-20-2017),” filter for “Secondary Sources” then “Law Reviews & Journals”). 
 3 See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 198 (2004) (noting 
that “[m]ost corporate scholars assume for various reasons that the interests that should matter to 
directors of most publicly held corporations are those of shareholders”). 
 4 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (arguing 
that the role of managerial power is of high importance and should be considered when studying 
executive compensation schemes or general corporate governance), with Bengt Holmstrom, Pay 
Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment, 30 J. CORP. L. 703 
(2005) (commenting on and disagreeing with some aspects of Bebchuk and Fried’s views on man-
agerial power). See also Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if 
Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013 (2009) (discussing “excessive” executive 
compensation in the wake of the 2007 recession). 
 5 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance 
Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1317 (2009) (contending that “[t]he quest to design a single, 
global rating methodology should be replaced by an effort to design two separate methodologies 
for assessing the governance of companies with and without a controlling shareholder”); Sanjai 
Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indi-
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of shareholders versus directors.6 Empirical studies examining the impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance7 and the efficacy of corporate 
governance reforms remain frustratingly inconclusive.8 
In spite of the widespread belief that the American system of corporate 
governance is one of the best in the world,9 substantial evidence shows that 
                                                                                                                           
ces, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1808 (2008) (contending that “no consistent relation between the 
academic and related commercial governance indices and corporate performance” exists); Paul 
Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 891 (2007) (noting the potential 
for conflicts of interest in firms that issue corporate governance ratings). For an example of a 
seminal work establishing a widely used corporate governance index, see Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. 
Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 
For a proposed revision of corporate governance rating methods, see Thuy-Nga T. Vo, Rating 
Management Behavior and Ethics: A Proposal to Upgrade the Corporate Governance Rating 
Criteria, 34 J. CORP. L. 1 (2008). 
 6 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 836 (2005) (contending that corporate shareholders should have the right to “vote to 
adopt changes in [a] company’s basic corporate governance arrangements”), with Theodore N. 
Mirvis, Paul K. Rowe & William Savitt, Bebchuk’s “Case for Increasing Shareholder Power”: 
An Opposition, 118 HARV. L. REV. F. 43, 43–44 (2007) (objecting to granting such rights to cor-
porate shareholders). This debate can become quite impassioned. See Martin Lipton & William 
Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 733 (2007) (characterizing Beb-
chuk’s then-recent publication as “the most recent salvo in [his] twenty-year campaign to recast 
the corporate law of Delaware in the image of his own writings . . . [that ignores] decades of salu-
tary historical development and the overwhelming lessons of observed boardroom behav-
ior . . . .”). 
 7 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–43 (2005) (collecting studies related to corporate govern-
ance after Sarbanes-Oxley); Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung & Albert H. Yoon, What Else 
Matters for Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 998–
1006 (2008) (collecting studies related to corporate governance); see also Omari Scott Simmons, 
The Corporate Immune System: Governance from the Inside Out, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1167 
(noting that studies related to board independence are inconclusive). 
 8 Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Melt-
down? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 18 (2009) (citing Bernard Black, Does Corpo-
rate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2133–34 
(2001)) (“[A]cademic testing of the hypothesis that good corporate governance improves corpo-
rate financial performance has yielded inconclusive results.”); Colin Melvin & Hans-Christoph 
Hirt, Corporate Governance and Performance: The Missing Links, in THE BUSINESS CASE FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 201, 201–04 (Ken Rushton ed., 2008); Chin Fei Goh, et al., Corporate 
Governance: A Literature Review with a Focus on Technology Firms, PROCEDIA – SOC. & BE-
HAV. SCI., May 2014, at 39, 43 (surveying the corporate governance literature and finding empiri-
cal evidence inconclusive, which may be based on varying institutional contexts); Omari Scott 
Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 262 (2015) (noting the “absence of 
robust empirical support or inconclusive findings surrounding an array of corporate governance 
reforms”).  
 9 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2016). Business 
Roundtable is an organization of CEOs of U.S. corporations. Id. at i. The document explains: 
Business Roundtable CEOs continue to believe that the United States has the best 
corporate governance, financial reporting and securities markets systems in the 
world. These systems work because they give public companies not only a frame-
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many CEOs frequently prioritize their own interests over those of sharehold-
ers,10 boards excessively indulge CEOs,11 and shareholders exert weak influ-
ence over board composition and decision-making.12 While the market for 
corporate control offers some ability to discipline inefficient managerial 
behavior in enabling shareholders to exercise their exit power in selling 
their equity stock,13 this instrument is inherently blunt and limited.14 The 
rise of institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, insu-
lates individual shareholders from corporate action, thus dulling their motiva-
tion to exercise their control rights.15 Furthermore, ongoing changes in the 
capital markets cast doubt on the long-established role of equity shareholders 
as the most efficient means of managing agency costs.16 
                                                                                                                           
work of laws and regulations that establish minimum requirements but also the flex-
ibility to implement customized practices that suit the companies’ needs and to mod-
ify those practices in light of changing conditions and standards. 
Id. at 1. 
 10 Henry L. Tosi, Luis R. Gomez-Meija & Debra L. Moody, The Separation of Ownership 
and Control: Increasing the Responsiveness of Boards of Directors to Shareholders’ Interests?, 4 
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 40 (1991) (“[T]he governance structure of many firms is not de-
signed to effectively facilitate the motivation of the top management in a way that best represents 
shareholders’ interests.”); see Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. 
FIN. ECON. 431, 458–59 (1988) (presenting evidence suggesting that outsider dominated boards 
are more likely and more quickly to replace a CEO due to poor company stock performance than 
insider dominated boards). 
 11 Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 4, at 767. Board members may collude with CEOs to 
increase their own compensation. Ivan E. Brick, Oded Palmon & John K. Wald, CEO Compensa-
tion, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 
403, 421–22 (2006) (finding evidence of a positive relationship between CEO and director com-
pensation and concluding that it is consistent with cronyism or mutual back scratching between 
the CEO and the board of directors); see also LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 30 (2004) (“Direc-
tors have a natural interest in their own compensation . . . . Independent directors who are gener-
ous with the CEO might reasonably expect the CEO to use his or her bully pulpit to support higher 
director compensation.”). 
 12 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999) (observing that shareholder powers in publicly-traded corporations to 
elect the board and vote on certain corporate changes are “[i]n both theory and practice . . . so 
weak as to be virtually meaningless”). 
 13 See Henry R. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Cor-
porate Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 365, 369–70; Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and Nature of Con-
trol: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 109–11 (2003). 
 14 Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. 
REV. 745, 747 (2000) (“The market for corporate control is an overly blunt tool for ongoing man-
agement discipline and is subject to extensive market and legal constraints.”). 
 15 See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
1385, 1433–34 (2008). 
 16 See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, 
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 235 (2008) (noting the 
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In the United States, the predominant response to these trends has been 
to regulate corporate governance. In particular, federal securities law has be-
come a powerful mechanism to intervene in corporate governance.17 Despite 
sharp disagreements regarding their effectiveness, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”)18 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”)19 impose mandatory governance rules on matters 
understood by many academics and practitioners to be solely under the con-
trol of the board of directors.20 SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act include numer-
ous regulatory mandates and incentives that empower shareholders.21 Rules 
enacted under SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act regulate mandatory disclosure, 
shareholder proxy access, executive compensation, audit committees, and 
internal controls.22 Scholars have questioned whether this newfound faith in 
regulatory intervention is misplaced.23 
The ability of corporations to attract enormous amounts of equity in-
vestment and return a profit to shareholders belies the above-mentioned 
weaknesses of modern corporate governance.24 How can this be explained? 
This Article posits that the currently predominant view of corporate govern-
ance is inherently incomplete. While legal scholars have extensively exam-
ined various combinations of board, shareholder, and CEO power, little atten-
                                                                                                                           
ability of private equity owners to manage and transfer capital risks through derivatives and other 
risk management tools). 
 17 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corpo-
rate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 622–23 (2006); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race 
for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685, 694–95 (2009); Jill E. Fisch, The 
New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 39–41 
(2004). 
 18 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 406(a)–(b), 116 Stat. 745, 789; 15 
U.S.C. § 7264 (2012) [hereinafter SOX]. 
 19 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 20 Compare Romano, supra note 7, at 1602–03 (dismissing SOX), and Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 
1796–1819 (2011) (critiquing the Dodd-Frank Act), with Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, 
Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 1843, 1907–09 (2007) (supporting SOX), and John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1022–29 (2012) (responding to Romano and supporting SOX and the 
Dodd-Frank Act). 
 21 See supra notes 18–19. 
 22 See infra notes 86–130 and accompanying text. 
 23 See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 309, 335 (2011) (criticizing post-financial crisis corporate governance reforms as based 
on “simplistic logic” premised on the belief “that if management was the problem, shareholders 
must be the solution”). 
 24 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737, 737 (1997). 
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tion has been given to essential sources of corporate governance inside the 
firm itself. This view of the firm as a “black box” that is monolithic and coor-
dinated obscures the important role that internal forces play in governing the 
firm,25 and it is the goal of this Article to show how these internal forces serve 
an essential role in corporate governance. 
Specifically, this Article argues that corporate governance works in part 
because it operates intrinsically in organizations where there is a separation of 
ownership and control. Integrating legal analysis with insights from organiza-
tional management and finance scholarship, this Article argues that three 
forces work in loose concert to motivate organizational actors to promote 
corporate governance in pursuit of their own self-interest. First, a robust 
compliance system establishes the benchmarks that govern the enterprise. 
Second, joint investments in firm-specific human capital tie actors to the firm 
and incentivize long-term organizational citizenship. Third, mutual monitor-
ing by superiors and subordinates nudge the organization toward good gov-
ernance practices and away from self-interested behavior that erodes firm 
value. As this Article shows, the self-serving actions of senior managers are 
constrained by the potential reaction of subordinates who monitor their supe-
riors for their own interests. The combination of these three forces generates 
what we call organic corporate governance, which enables organizations to 
thrive and helps illuminate how corporate governance can protect firm value 
even when governance practices are weak and regulatory authority is limited. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the major theories of 
corporate governance—showing how the day-to-day reality of firm manage-
ment may be mismatched with theoretical assumptions and explaining the 
challenges of managerial accountability.26 Part II examines how federal secu-
rities regulation has been used as a vehicle for reforming corporate govern-
ance through shareholder empowerment, highlighting the appeal and inherent 
limitations of this approach.27 Part III presents the three forces that generate 
organic corporate governance.28 These forces—compliance, firm-specific 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Thomas Clarke, The Long Road to Reformulating the Understanding of Directors’ Duties: 
Legalizing Team Production Theory?, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 447 (2015) (criticizing agency 
theory for not entering the “black box” of the firm and “hopelessly misconceiv[ing] the motiva-
tions of managers [by] reducing their complex existence to a dehumanized stimulus/response 
mechanism”); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation 
in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 684 (2010) (“Public law typically has little concern with 
the decisionmaking processes of private actors. It usually treats regulatory targets as unitary ‘black 
boxes,’ best motivated by regulatory specificity on the one hand, and external incentives in the 
form of outcome-based monitoring and sanctions on the other.”). 
 26 See infra notes 31–87 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 88–145 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 146–249 and accompanying text. 
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human capital, and mutual monitoring—provide the motivation for organiza-
tional actors to act in the firm’s best interests through pursuit of their own 
goals. Part IV shows how organic corporate governance works in practice by 
focusing on the CLO,29 who is uniquely capable of generating organic corpo-
rate governance within the organization.30 If the CLO and other key corporate 
actors are appropriately empowered, organic corporate governance can serve 
as the foundation for a de facto form of self-regulation that complements ex-
ternal regulation and diminishes the need for blanket, one-size-fits-all regula-
tory intervention in the governance of the firm. 
I. THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 
Corporate governance has been variously defined as a structure for ex-
erting power inside of a firm,31 constraints that shape bargaining over firm 
quasi-rents,32 or a “system of rules . . . and processes” that direct and control 
the enterprise.33 Although all of these definitions hold explanatory power, 
corporate governance is fundamentally concerned with ensuring managers 
keep their promises through embedded relationships within the organiza-
tion.34 These promises and relationships protect the integrity of the firm so 
that it can most efficiently achieve its stated goals. Both normatively and de-
scriptively, this process hinges on where the corporation’s locus of control 
should exist and “toward what ends that control . . . should be exercised.”35 
The following discussion examines the inter-relationships between manage-
ment and the other two major corporate actors—the board of directors and 
                                                                                                                           
 29 The CLO is the most salient example due to its power and stature in U.S. corporations. 
Other corporate officers—most notably, the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) and the Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO)—are also capable of furthering organic corporate governance through their man-
dates to preserve firm value from misuse, waste, or sanction. 
 30 See infra notes 250–334 and accompanying text.  
 31 See Stephen J. Lubben, Separation and Dependence: Explaining Modern Corporate Gov-
ernance, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 894 (2013). 
 32 See Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECO-
NOMICS AND THE LAW 4 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 33 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An 
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014); Curtis J. Milhaupt, 
Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1151 (1998) (“After all, corporate governance is 
about control structures for firms.”). 
 34 See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 1 (2008) (“The purpose of corporate governance is to persuade, induce, compel, and 
otherwise motivate corporate managers to keep the promises they make to investors.”); Robert C. 
Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 203, 218 & n.88 (2016) (citing various sources emphasizing corporate governance as 
embedded in relationships). 
 35 Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015). 
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shareholders. It focuses on the evolution of ongoing debates about how to 
address a core problem: how to minimize the possibility of managerial abuse 
while maximizing the efficiencies of managerial autonomy. 
A. The Berle-Means Corporation and Its Legacy of Director Primacy 
Canonical work by legal scholars has shaped contemporary debates 
about the corporate form. The predominant understanding of the American 
corporation stems from the work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, who 
identified the management of issues, arising from the separation of ownership 
and control, as the primary function of corporate governance.36 Melvin Ei-
senberg’s book The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis, asserts 
that publicly-held corporations cannot alone direct the operation of the firm.37 
According to Eisenberg, those with direct ties to the enterprise should no 
longer dominate the board of directors.38 Instead, directors must be independ-
ent, which is a rigorous standard for directors to meet.39 Such directors must 
have power as well as separation from management in order to be able “to 
select and remove members of the chief executive’s office.”40 The board’s 
principal function should be to monitor management’s actions.41 
                                                                                                                           
 36 ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPER-
TY 6 (1932) (“The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests 
of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks 
which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear.”); see also Padfield, supra note 35, 
at 1, 4. Although the ownership-control separation is given top billing as Berle & Means’s promi-
nent contribution, they expressed somber concern about the dominance of economic power in the 
hands of corporations. In their view, if allowed to continue to grow un-checked, corporations 
would potentially supersede the state as the dominant form of social organization. BERLE & 
MEANS, supra, at 357. Such important contributions were set aside, and the ownership-control 
insight was leveraged to justify corporations seeking uninhibited profit maximization to the exclu-
sion of other social or community interests. See ALEXANDER STYHRE, CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE, THE FIRM AND INVESTOR CAPITALISM 63 (2016) (arguing that interpreting a “shareholder 
welfare agenda” from Berle & Means “is a narrow-minded and essentially faulty reading of Berle 
and Means’s work”). How Berle & Means’s work, inspired by a collectivist tradition, became a 
hallmark for unbridled individualism remains a topic of continued study. See Dalia Tsuk, From 
Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 179, 180–81 (2005). 
 37 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
175 (1976). For contemporary reviews of Eisenberg’s book, see Donald E. Schwartz, In Search of 
the Corporate Soul, 87 YALE L.J. 685 (1978). 
 38 EISENBERG, supra note 37, at 175–76. 
 39 Any person who is a firm executive, has a professional relationship with the company, or is 
a close relative to them is not considered independent. Id. at 175. 
 40 Id. at 176. 
 41 Id. at 175–76; see also Schwartz, supra note 37, at 686. 
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Michael Jensen and William Meckling famously argue that the corpora-
tion is constituted by a “nexus of contracts” among individuals.42 These con-
tracts are, by their nature, agency relationships, whereby one person or entity 
(the principal) assigns work to a second person or entity (the agent), which 
then performs that work,43 typically in exchange for compensation. Agency 
relationships, though often beneficial, also impose agency costs when the 
goals of the principal and the agent conflict and when the principal cannot 
easily monitor what its agent is doing.44 Without intervention, agents tend to 
act in pursuit of their own interests rather than the interests of the principal.45 
From the unobserved night-watchman who sleeps on the job to the CEO who 
surreptitiously usurps value at the expense of shareholders, agency relation-
ships and their costs appear in all walks of economic life.46 These agency 
costs, if left unchecked by a board that is unable or unwilling to monitor, may 
have systemic effects that go beyond the firm.47 A fundamental goal of corpo-
rate governance is to minimize those agency costs that arise from the separa-
tion of ownership and control in the most efficient way possible, thereby in-
creasing shareholder value. 
Elaborating on these ideas, the predominant model of corporate govern-
ance in the United States is director primacy. The Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law provides for the centralization of corporate decision-making in the 
board of directors, stating that “[t]he business and affairs of every corpora-
tion . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”48 
Under the director primacy model, the corporation serves as a mechanism by 
which the board retains various factors of production for the enterprise.49 The 
board generates capital by selling debt and equity securities to bondholders 
and shareholders, who serve as risk-bearers.50 The board acts as a “[p]latonic 
guardian,” serving as the central point for the various contracts that define the 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial, Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11 (1976); see also Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the 
Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 821–22 (1999). 
 43 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 57, 58 (1989). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 265, 271 (1998). 
 46 See id. 
 47 See Kristen N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulat-
ing Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 890–91 (noting critics that cite the role of incen-
tive-based compensation as a proximate cause of the 2008 financial crisis). 
 48 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2017). 
 49 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003). 
 50 Id. at 560. 
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corporation.51 Directors have authority to control corporate assets, possess 
exclusive power to approve corporate actions, and are insulated from individ-
ual liability through the business judgment rule.52 
Shareholders, by contrast, have limited rights and are, at best, only able 
to react to decisions the board has made.53 These limitations may be norma-
tively justifiable, and even preferred by the shareholders themselves,54 as 
shareholders may lack the expertise to intervene in the corporation’s affairs.55 
In exchange, the board furthers the interests of shareholders by pursuing the 
generally accepted goal of shareholder wealth maximization.56 Boards were 
once thought to be passive in their interactions with shareholders as well as 
management.57 Today, proponents argue, boards are more engaged and have 
better access to information than boards in the past.58 They also are more like-
ly to be financially invested in the firm’s success—i.e., “to have skin in the 
game”—through ownership of stock.59 The notion of board primacy has an 
intuitive appeal arising from the need for centralized hierarchy and authority 
in decision-making.60 That appeal, combined with the increasing influence of 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Id. 
 52 See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism 
in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1015, 1023–24. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 802–03 
(2007). Lynn Stout provocatively questions: “Are investors stupid? Why do they not avoid IPOs 
with weak shareholder rights? Is it possible that shareholders, like Ulysses, sometimes see ad-
vantage in ‘tying their own hands’ and ceding control over the corporation to directors largely 
insulated from their own influence?” Id. at 803. She concludes that “compelling empirical evi-
dence” exists that “investors themselves often prefer weak shareholder rights.” Id. 
 55 D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensa-
tion, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 857 (2007) (citing Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 568). 
 56 Id. But see Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (arguing that corporations are not legally required to maximize corporate 
profits). 
 57 Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 449 (1996) (noting that a “vast separation” once existed between boards 
and corporate shareholders “created no impetus for a meaningful link” between the two). As Mel-
vin Eisenberg explains: 
Making business policy, although widely held to be a central board function, is usu-
ally beyond the competence of the board, since a corporate organ cannot be mean-
ingfully involved in making business policy unless its members are highly active, 
and it is not realistic to expect a high degree of activity from the board. 
MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 169 (photo. 
reprint 2006) (1976). 
 58 Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 563. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Telman, supra note 55, at 861. 
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independent board members to better detect managerial misconduct, reinforc-
es board primacy as an appealing conception of corporate governance.61 
Team production theory, most prominently associated with Margaret 
Blair and Lynn Stout, also vests decision-making authority in the board of 
directors but suggests a different set of responsibilities.62 The board acts as a 
“mediating hierarch” that balances the interests of corporate constituencies 
and, as a result, successfully manages the challenges associated with coordi-
nation and investment associated with productive economic activity.63 In this 
capacity, directors are not merely agents maximizing rents on behalf of other 
interests.64 Rather, they balance the interests of various constituents in order 
to ensure that the coalition of shareholders, managers, and other interests re-
main intact.65 This is similar to the essential functions of organizations them-
selves, whereby inputs from a variety of interest groups, such as employees, 
managers, and creditors, coordinate to produce outputs for the firm.66 
B. The Problem of Agency Costs and the Rationale for  
Shareholder Empowerment 
In practice, boards do, in fact, delegate substantial authority to manage-
ment.67 The day-to-day power of the corporation still rests primarily in the 
hands of the CEO.68 The notion that corporate management should be the 
strategic center of the corporation is known as managerial primacy.69 The 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See id. at 855–56. 
 62 Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a Paradigm, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
397, 399 (2015) (“[I]t is doubtful whether the team production model constitutes a sufficiently 
radical departure from other theories to qualify as a new paradigm.”). According to Cheffins, the 
original conception of team production theory sought to refine, rather than reject, prevailing mod-
els. Id. 
 63 Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 271–87. For a historical perspective on team production, 
see Ron Harris, The History of Team Production Theory, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 537 (2015). 
 64 Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 280. 
 65 Id. at 280–81. 
 66 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An In-
troduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 745 (1999). 
 67 See Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1051, 1067 (noting the ways that executives handle most corporate decisions). 
 68 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 19 (2008). However, Bainbridge also argues that the balance of power in corporations is 
shifting toward boards and away from CEOs. Id.; see also EISENBERG, supra note 37, at 140 (stat-
ing that “[a]ll serious students of corporate affairs recognize that [management of] . . . the corpora-
tion’s business in the ordinary meaning of that term . . . is vested in the executives”); Telman, 
supra note 55, at 859 (“[M]anagerialism seems to have a far stronger empirical basis than the 
director-primacy model . . . .”). 
 69 See Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American Corporations, 71 
BUS. LAW. 381, 397 (2016) (characterizing managerial primacy as the dominance of the CEO and 
top executives). 
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CEO and other corporate executives retain control over production, bureau-
cracy, and employee opportunity.70 They act as “stewards” who guide the 
corporation in the interests of numerous stakeholders, including shareholders, 
customers, employees, and society.71 From this perspective, “power, prestige, 
and job security”—rather than pure profit-seeking—motivate managers.72 
The CEO and other corporate officers, like board directors, owe fiduci-
ary duties as agents to the corporation under state corporate law.73 Managerial 
primacy, however, enables executives to engage in self-enriching behavior 
and inefficient activities.74 Executives are prone to conflicts of interest be-
tween their individual interests and those of their firms.75 Modern corporate 
governance scholarship has been largely devoted to finding more effective 
ways to align the incentives of managers and shareholders, who hold residual 
claims on the firm and therefore bear most of the economic risk of managerial 
decisions.76 
One way to align the incentives of managers and shareholders is through 
variable executive compensation, such as pay-for-performance and stock op-
tion packages.77 Incentive pay has become a standard component of executive 
remuneration.78 In a little over a decade since the early 2000s, the average 
compensation of CEOs has more than doubled, from approximately three mil-
lion dollars to over seven million dollars.79 Even proponents of director prima-
cy have questioned whether directors are capable of holding managers ac-
                                                                                                                           
 70 William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1989). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1494 (citing GARDINER C. MEANS, THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 171 
(1962)). 
 73 Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1600 n.10 (2005). 
 74 Yaron Nili, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder Activism, 4 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 162 (2014). 
 75 See Rodrigues, supra note 67, at 1070–71 (citing executive compensation as an example). 
 76 Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 16, at 232, 241; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 67–68 (1991) (explaining 
why shareholders are incentivized to maximize firm value). 
 77 See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incen-
tives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 225–26 (1990); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incen-
tives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 139. 
 78 Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, ANN. REV. FIN. ECON., Dec. 2010, at 
84–86; Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 653, 679 (1998) (identifying various factors that dramatically increased the relationship 
between pay and performance). 
 79 Lee Harris, CEO Retention, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1753, 1762 (2013). 
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countable to shareholders through internally-derived and internally-enforced 
incentives alone.80 
Advocates of shareholder empowerment argue that shareholders—rather 
than boards—must be given more direct control over the levers of corporate 
governance to ensure that managers do not shirk their fiduciary duties by ex-
tracting private benefits from the firm.81 Many proponents analogize share-
holders as owners of the corporation and the corporation as the property of 
shareholders.82 Shareholders of American corporations, however, have weak 
and heavily qualified independent powers under state corporate law.83 Chris 
Bruner analogizes U.S. shareholders to “spectators” that must entrust the firm 
to management ex ante and then sue after the fact if things go wrong.84 Under 
state corporate law, the primary source of shareholder authority is the power 
to elect and replace directors.85 Shareholders, however, face numerous legal 
obstacles that impede their ability to exercise this right.86 For the most part, 
shareholders have three ways to ensure the value of their investment in the 
corporation: they can vote, sell, or sue.87 As a result of these limitations, cor-
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 198 (“[T]here is a question whether ‘board primacy’ ade-
quately deals with agency costs.”). For example, managers have the potential to unfairly influence 
the board of directors and demand compensation that would be considered excessive in an arms-
length negotiation. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 11, at 62. 
 81 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 678–
82 (2007); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 68, at 21 (defining shareholder primacy as the view 
that “shareholders do (and should) exercise ultimate control of the corporate enterprise”); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 
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should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value”). 
 82 Bruner, supra note 15, at 1405; see also David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. 
L. REV. 223, 230–31 (1991) (describing that shareholders hold corporations as property); Milton 
Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, 
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But see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Introduction to the Metaphors of Corporate Law, 4 SEATTLE J. 
SOC. JUST. 273, 279–80 (2005) (listing traditional property rights that shareholders do not pos-
sess). 
 83 See Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 
VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 593–603 (2011). 
 84 Bruner, supra note 23, at 333 (contrasting with the more active “stewardship” role of U.K. 
shareholders). 
 85 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 851 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2013)). 
 86 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 
44–46, 64–66 (2003) (noting the lack of shareholder access to the proxy statement). 
 87 George S. Geis, Ex-Ante Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 609, 613 (2016) (“Equity 
owners may expel lousy directors during annual elections, launch a lawsuit to punish bad manag-
ers, or just sell their shares in disgust and walk away.”); Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and 
Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216–17 (1999). 
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porate governance remains an imperfect system of reinforcing and aligning 
incentives of parties that have economic interests in the firm. 
II. SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
BY REGULATORY INTERVENTION 
To enhance the accountability of managers, regulatory mandates enacted 
under federal securities law, most notably SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act, seek 
to empower shareholders. Regulation has boosted the ability of shareholders 
to monitor and intervene in corporate governance decision-making. The fol-
lowing discussion examines this form of regulatory intervention in corporate 
governance, highlighting its appeal and shortcomings, and suggesting that 
these measures alone cannot comprehensively resolve the conundrum of 
management autonomy and the principal-agent problem. 
A. The Application of Federal Securities Law to Empower Shareholders 
Shareholder empowerment relies on regulatory intervention through 
federal securities law. The enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) created a mechanism for 
federal intervention in corporate governance.88 The rulemaking powers of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), created by the Securities Act, 
transformed corporate governance from a market-based approach, based on 
broad discretion afforded to boards under Delaware corporate law, to a gov-
ernment-sponsored approach, in which federal rules establish procedural re-
quirements on U.S. publicly-listed corporations.89 Federal securities regula-
tion has been the focus of reform initiatives that constrain management’s abil-
ity to disregard shareholders demands.90 These reforms fall into two broad 
categories: regulations that enable shareholders to monitor manager behavior 
and regulations that permit shareholders to intervene in traditionally man-
agement-led corporate decision-making. 
The SEC seeks to protect investors (both current shareholders and other 
capital market participants),91 and “its main tool is mandatory disclosure.”92 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2075, 2114 (2016). 
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An oft-cited rationale for disclosure is a corollary of Louis Brandeis’ famous 
statement, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the 
most efficient policeman.”93 Aside from providing investment-related infor-
mation to investors, SEC disclosure rules are also intended to shape corporate 
governance by facilitating shareholder monitoring.94 Disclosure requirements 
indirectly reduce agency costs by deterring managerial misconduct through 
the threat of public exposure.95 SEC Rule 10b-5 fraud liability, to cite one 
example, strengthens fiduciary duties by enabling investors to identify an in-
sider’s wrongdoing.96 SEC rules and regulations governing mandatory disclo-
sure delineate the procedural and substantive scope of communication by 
corporations to shareholders.97 The Exchange Act requires the ongoing dis-
closure of extensive information regarding a company’s management, risks, 
operations, and financial condition, among other information.98 
SOX embraced federal regulatory intervention into corporate govern-
ance and serves as an important means to protect and empower sharehold-
ers.99 A key component of SOX is disclosure.100 Among its disclosure provi-
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 92 Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in Securities Disclosure 
Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2010); see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 
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 94 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
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 95 Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a 
More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 151–52 (2006); 
see also Williams, supra note 94, at 1282–84 (arguing that disclosure of a firm’s compliance with 
the law enables investors to assess the integrity of management). 
 96 Roe, supra note 92, at 616 (stating that “[e]x ante, to force disclosure that ‘this company is 
run by thieves’ usually keeps the thieves out”). 
 97 Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
789, 838 (2014) (comparing Regulation FD’s process-oriented ban on selective disclosure and 
liability for material omissions or misrepresentations in SEC-regulated communications under 
SEC Rule 10b-5). 
 98 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a–qq (2012). 
 99 Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Commissioner, stated: 
“[G]ood” corporate governance is intended to cause corporate decisions to take ap-
propriate account of the various (and sometimes conflicting) constituencies whose 
interests the corporation must take into account[.] Sarbanes-Oxley codifies certain 
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sions is Section 406, which requires a company to disclose its code of ethics 
and any waivers granted to its top three executives.101 These disclosure re-
quirements were specifically designed to prevent Enron-style related party 
transactions, which traditionally have been subject to state corporate law.102 
The Dodd-Frank Act, the second major corporate governance reform 
following SOX, includes extensive disclosure-oriented provisions under fed-
eral securities law. These provisions seek to reduce information asymmetries 
between managers and shareholders by enhancing disclosure requirements 
regarding various aspects of executive compensation.103 In addition, the 
Dodd-Frank Act introduced mandatory social disclosure in federal securities 
law.104 These mandatory social disclosures rely on targeted disclosure of spe-
cific adverse social impacts, coupled with “due diligence, monitoring, audit-
ing, and supply chain management requirements,” to change corporate behav-
ior.105 Companies can use their compliance with mandatory social disclosure 
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armed conflict and human rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Dodd-Frank Act 
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EBPZ]. In January 2017, the SEC announced its intention to reconsider the appropriateness of 
Section 1502. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Acting Chairman Michael S. Piwowar, Public State-
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 105 Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 123 (2014); see also Williams, supra note 94, at 1295 (“[M]easuring social 
and environmental effects in a consistent, comparable way could act as an impetus for manage-
ment to reduce those impacts that shareholders could interpret as negative.”). 
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requirements to signal their socially responsible conduct to shareholders.106 
Regulators, such as the SEC, can help coordinate and enforce emerging 
norms and best practices arising from these requirements.107 It is unclear, 
however, whether shareholders—rather than other stakeholders and society 
generally—should be the primary beneficiaries of mandatory social disclo-
sure.108 
Other corporate governance reforms under federal securities law seek to 
reduce hurdles to shareholder intervention in management decisions.109 Most 
important and prominent among these reforms is access to the shareholder 
proxy. The proxy process permits any shareholders that are not present at the 
annual meeting to vote.110 Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act grants the SEC 
the authority to regulate the shareholder proxy solicitation process.111 Proxy 
access implicates two distinct, yet interrelated, rights that shareholders may 
exercise: the right to elect directors and the right to include proposals in the 
corporation’s proxy solicitation.112 The expansion of these rights lies at the 
heart of the fierce debates among practitioners and legal scholars about 
shareholder power. 
With respect to board elections, shareholder power is limited at times. 
Management, in their discretion, can exclude from its proxy materials a 
shareholder proposal that relates to the nomination or election of board direc-
tors, unless otherwise permitted under the corporation’s by-laws.113 Share-
holders, consequently, must conduct and finance director nominations on 
their own.114 Shareholder advocates have fought for SEC regulations that 
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would require corporations to permit shareholders to nominate directors di-
rectly through the proxy statement, making it easier to replace directors.115 
These arguments grew stronger in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis due to 
questions about board oversight and accountability.116 Under the authority 
granted by Section 971 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC issued new proxy 
access rules in 2010.117 SEC Rule 14a-11 would have required a publicly-
traded company to include in its proxy materials a candidate nominated by 
any shareholders that held shares representing at least three percent of the 
voting power of the company’s stock for the past three years.118 The three-
year holding period requirement was intended to address concerns about 
short-termism—i.e., the need to insulate board directors from pressures exert-
ed by investors qua shareholders that prioritize short-term profits over longer-
term considerations.119 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the proxy 
access rules enacted in 2010, prior to their full implementation.120 
With respect to other means to effectuate shareholder proposals, share-
holders may submit proposals for consideration at the annual meeting.121 The 
shareholder proposal mechanism is the most widely recognized and formal 
method for shareholders to exercise their voice in corporate decision-
making.122 This mechanism is the primary procedural vehicle with which 
shareholders can shape corporate governance practices ex ante, rather than 
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 117 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by 
Shareholders (Aug. 25, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm [https://perma.
cc/9VZN-PXCV]. 
 118 See generally Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage 
Share Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (2012) (analyzing the 
potential impact of Rule 14a-11). 
 119 See Bebchuk, supra note 115, at 1638–39, 1648; see also Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,697–99 (Sept. 16, 2010). The problem of short-termism is 
also the rationale behind tenure (or time-weighted) voting, whereby a shareholder’s voting power 
increases based on the duration of its ownership of the corporation’s stock. While the SEC has 
historically favored uniform voting based on the “one share, one vote” principle, its current policy 
does not prohibit U.S. stock exchanges from enacting tenure voting rules. See David J. Berger, 
Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting and the U.S. Public Company 72 
BUS. LAW. 295, 318–21 (2017) (noting the enactment of SEC Rule 19c-4 in 1988, which was 
overturned by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990, and the SEC Voting Rights Policy that is 
currently in force). 
 120 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The 2010 proxy access 
rules also included an amended SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which would have required corporations to 
include shareholder proposals regarding director nomination procedures in their proxy materials. 
 121 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (setting forth the criteria that a shareholder must meet to submit 
a proposal). 
 122 See Roe, supra note 92, at 622 (declaring that “voice . . . is a means to power”). 
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relying on their right to vote, sue, or sell their shares.123 A shareholder pro-
posal typically consists of a resolution that proposes a policy or a standard to 
be adopted and an accompanying explanatory statement.124 Management 
must include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials, unless it can 
demonstrate to the SEC that it is entitled to exclude it.125 Among the permis-
sible substantive justifications for excluding a shareholder proposal is if the 
proposal deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business op-
erations.126 A shareholder proposal that receives a majority vote of the share-
holders is only advisory—unless it concerns an action reserved for the board 
under the corporation’s charter.127 Nonetheless, through the shareholder pro-
posal mechanism, shareholders can seek to influence corporate decision-
making by advocating for specific causes.128 In particular, the shareholder 
proposal mechanism is increasingly attractive to activist shareholders seeking 
to compel greater attention to social and environmental issues.129 Even 
though most proposals are precatory, the mere possibility of strong share-
holder support may pressure the board to respond or to negotiate an accom-
modation.130 Shareholders benefit by being able to voice their concerns to 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See Geis, supra note 87, at 613–22. 
 124 Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public 
Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 274–75 (2016). 
 125 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(g) (“Except as otherwise noted, the burden is on the company to 
demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.”). 
 126 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7). The opaqueness of the ordinary business exclusion has spurred pro-
activist scholars to argue for its abandonment or for certain topics to be carved out. See, e.g., Luci-
an A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 83, 89–97 (2010) (distinguishing political contributions from ordinary business deci-
sions); Dhir, supra note 112, at 408 (citing calls to eliminate the ordinary business exception in 
order to facilitate corporate social accountability). 
 127 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7). 
 128 See Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfi-
nancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 661 (2016) (describing shareholder proposals as “the most wide-
ly used and least expensive means of shareholder activism [that] are typically part of a multifacet-
ed campaign of sustained engagement between an activist and the board or corporate manage-
ment”). 
 129 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 126, at 96 (noting the SEC’s recognition of the depth 
of interest among shareholders in social policy issues); Dhir, supra note 112, at 382–83 (noting 
the growing use of shareholder proposals since the 1970s to force companies to address their hu-
man rights and labor practices). The most common social responsibility proposals relate to politi-
cal contributions and lobbying disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions, climate change and sustaina-
bility. Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 223 (2018). 
 130 Geis, supra note 87, at 614. But see Joseph Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access 
Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 380–83 (2010) (criticizing the “meg-
aphone externalities” of proxy access); Haan, supra note 124, at 300–02 (identifying the prepon-
derance of settlements between management and shareholders regarding social and environmental 
proposals and suggesting that such proposals are particularly vulnerable to opportunism, conflicts 
of interest, and information asymmetries). 
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management and other shareholders.131 However, various costs (in terms of 
corporate resources and shareholder attention), coupled with very low rates of 
success, suggest that the impact of shareholder proposals on firm value is un-
certain at best.132 
B. The Limitations of Shareholder Empowerment 
Shareholder empowerment has been the focal point of immense regula-
tory and organizational resources in the past couple decades. Its limitations, 
however, suggest that faith in this approach to corporate governance should 
be tempered. As this Article will briefly explain, shareholder empowerment 
is, in itself, insufficient to minimize agency costs and justify the costs associ-
ated with regulatory intervention, at least as a general rule and practice. 
First and foremost, shareholder empowerment is hampered by the chal-
lenges of collective action, thereby weakening the case for proxy access and 
other regulatory interventions.133 The nature of modern capital markets di-
minishes both the capacity and the willingness of shareholders to participate 
in corporate governance, belying Berle and Means’ archetype of vigilant 
shareholders imposing checks on management.134 Institutional investors (e.g., 
pension funds and mutual funds), which manage large blocks of equity stock 
on behalf of individual beneficiaries, lack sufficient economic incentives to 
devote resources to monitor management.135 Coordination mechanisms are 
too expensive and cumbersome to enable shareholders to exercise control 
over the firm.136 Shareholders are too disengaged to feasibly monitor manag-
                                                                                                                           
 131 See Haan, supra note 124, at 290, 292–93 (describing shareholder proposals as a “power-
ful warning shot in the board’s direction” and “the communication of shareholders’ expressive 
interests”); David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Gadflies at the Gate: Why Do Individual Investors 
Sponsor Shareholder Resolutions? STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES, Aug. 2016, at 3, https://www.gsb.
stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-59-gadlies-at-gate.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BTD7-JYH8] (citing instances in which individual shareholder activists were able to success-
fully change corporate policies and practices). 
 132 See Hirst, supra note 129, at 224 (noting that among the eleven most common types of social 
responsibility resolutions voted on at annual meetings in 2014, only one (out of 171 total) passed); 
see also Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 26th Annual Corpo-
rate Law Institute, Tulane University Law School: Federal Preemption of State Corporate Govern-
ance (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch032714dmg.html [https://
perma.cc/J2RB-FVV4] (arguing that “the vast majority of proposals are brought by individuals or 
institutions with idiosyncratic and often political agendas that are often unrelated to, or in conflict 
with, the interests of other shareholders”). 
 133 See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1239 (2004). 
 134 See supra notes 36–66 and accompanying text. 
 135 Nili, supra note 74, at 169. 
 136 Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 789 
(2011); see also Ribstein, supra note 3, at 200 (noting the high decision-making costs of enhanc-
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ers on potential conflicts of interests and self-dealing.137 Frequently, institu-
tional investors qua shareholders choose to sell rather than exercise their gov-
ernance rights.138 Ex ante, the ability and willingness of institutional investors 
to exit emboldens them to overlook—or even encourage—risk-taking by 
managers.139 It is unclear, at best, if regulation that addresses short-termism 
can combat any of these kinds of managerial behavior.140 
In addition, the use of regulatory intervention to empower shareholders 
transforms the principal-agent problem from a question of internal govern-
ance to one of external mandates.141 Many regulatory reforms under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, such as proxy access and say-on-pay, empower shareholders 
for the purpose of improving risk management.142 This touches on an existen-
tial debate in corporate governance theory: the extent that directors and man-
agers are legally obligated to maximize shareholder value to the exclusion of 
the public interest.143 Federal securities regulation incentivizes—or forces—
                                                                                                                           
ing shareholder participation). Proxy advisory firms, which provide firm-specific information for 
institutional investor clients, fill this informational gap. See Haan, supra note 124, at 314–16. 
 137 Rodrigues, supra note 67, at 1082; see also Elhauge, supra note 56, at 799 (noting that 
public shareholders as a group do not pursue moral or social goals even if individual shareholders 
deem them important). 
 138 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 893 (2013). The 
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forming. The most assured way to grab the value of that insight is selling the stock 
rather than incurring the costs and speculative future benefits of a shareholder inter-
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Id. 
 139 See Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Financial 
Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 527, 557 (2013) (“There is simply no reason to believe that strong-
er shareholders would have mitigated risk-taking in the run-up to the crisis or could be expected to 
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 140 See Simmons, supra note 7, at 1157. 
 141 See Griffith, supra note 88, at 2115 (arguing that federal securities regulation “effectively 
creates mandatory terms of corporate governance”). 
 142 See Johnson, supra note 103, at 97–100 (describing substantive governance reforms under 
the Dodd-Frank Act). “Say-on-pay” rules require that corporations hold advisory shareholder 
votes on executive compensation. See Dodd-Frank Act § 951. 
 143 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating 
Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 406 (2001) (noting constituency statutes that 
permit directors to consider the interests of non-shareholders even at the expense of stock value); 
Elhauge, supra note 56, at 756–57 (noting different views on the fiduciary duty to avoid profit-
maximizing illegality); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and 
Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 23–44 (2016) (proposing a public governance duty that 
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the firm to prioritize social goals, such as deterring insider trading or prevent-
ing short-sighted risk taking.144 Accordingly, to the extent that shareholders 
prioritize profits over social welfare, regulatory intervention may trigger a 
conflict between non-shareholder interests and shareholder goals.145  In sum, 
though all of these measures have their respective benefits, they alone cannot 
comprehensively resolve the conundrum of management autonomy and the 
principal-agent problem. 
III. INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: THE THREE ELEMENTS OF ORGANIC 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
In organizational terms, a black box paradigm operates on the assump-
tion that a company is a single, unified, and monolithic entity that makes de-
cisions similar to the manner individuals do.146 This entity is also assumed to 
make decisions entirely rationally and with the dominant goal of maximizing 
profits.147 Individual features of the firm, as well as individual incentives, are 
generally set aside.148 Scholars advocate opening the black box of the firm in 
order to better understand the minds and motivations of individual partici-
pants,149 but the tendency to treat the enterprise as unitary remains a conven-
ient shortcut for discussing organizations. Although more recent corporate 
governance research has sought to study the inner working of firms,150 inter-
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 144 See Griffith, supra note 88, at 2124–25. 
 145 See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 964 
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26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1464 (2005). 
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Principle?, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 465, 480 (2011). 
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nal forces that motivate organizational actors remain underexplored. The fol-
lowing discussion shows how three organizational dynamics—rules that gov-
ern, ties that bind, and incentives that control—operate together to generate 
behavior that is conducive to corporate governance even in environments of 
weak formal governance, insufficient regulation, and self-centered behavior.151 
A. Compliance: The Rules That Govern 
For organic governance to work, firms need benchmarks to establish 
how the firm shall be governed. The most significant source of such bench-
marks is the compliance function of the organization. Compliance consists of 
an organization’s “system of policies and controls” that “deter[s] violations of 
law” by its members and “assure[s] external authorities” that it is undertaking 
sufficient deterrence measures.152 Compliance aligns employee conduct with 
the external legal and ethical obligations of the firm by ensuring that employ-
ees act lawfully and ethically, enabling the monitoring and reporting of viola-
tions, and taking measures to prevent future violations.153 To meet these ob-
jectives, the compliance function is responsible for implementing a code of 
ethics and conduct, creating and managing internal procedures to ensure 
compliance with legal mandates, and developing legal and ethical training 
programs.154 The compliance function within a given corporation encom-
passes a broad range of substantive legal and regulatory obligations.155 The 
need to amass resources has spurred the emergence of a new professional 
field, devoted to compliance related to, but distinct from, the legal profes-
sion.156 The influence of the compliance function on corporate decision-
                                                                                                                           
 151 See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text; see also Brick et al., supra note 11 (finding 
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 154 Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and 
New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 466–67 (2008). 
 155 See Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization 
May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 96–97 (2014); see also Griffith, supra note 
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making has become so significant that it has prompted legal scholars to de-
clare compliance “the new corporate governance”157 and “a universal corpo-
rate governance activity.”158 
Compliance sets the benchmark to which governance practices adhere. 
Compliance drives its influence from at least two sources. The first source of 
compliance’s authority is the growing range of criminal laws that require or 
encourage firms to invest in more compliance.159 One example arises in the 
context of corporate prosecutions. A firm that enters into a settlement agree-
ment with a government prosecutor or regulatory agency may be subject to a 
corporate monitor.160 A corporate monitor, selected by the government, is re-
sponsible for ensuring that the firm improves its internal policies and proce-
dures to prevent future wrongdoing.161 As a condition of agreeing not to pros-
ecute (through a consent decree, deferred prosecution agreement, or non-
prosecution agreement), the government increasingly requires that the de-
fendant corporation invest significant resources to reform its compliance 
practices.162 Other examples arise through federal laws that incentivize com-
panies to invest in compliance—most notably, the federal sentencing guide-
lines.163 These investments in compliance—whether directly mandated or 
indirectly incentivized—involve the implementation of structural and institu-
tional changes that otherwise would be under the purview of senior manage-
ment or the board.164 Further, based on the premise that a robust compliance 
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manage internal corporate affairs, the ultimate source of authority for compliance is 
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46 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1 
function alters the internal incentives of managers ex ante, these measures 
attempt to shape corporate governance by improving corporate culture.165 
The second source of compliance authority comes from the multiplier 
effect compliance has on external regulatory mandates. This multiplier effect 
creates monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that—although managed by 
in-house lawyers or, increasingly, compliance officers—diffuse across the 
entire organization.166 In particular, compliance is often integrated with a 
firm’s risk management function.167 Firms assess how much to invest in com-
pliance (e.g., employee training, internal controls systems, incentives and 
penalties to encourage compliance) based on the risk of non-compliance or 
compliance risk.168 Firm-wide policies and procedures, traditionally derived 
from mandates and principles established by the board, are increasingly 
promulgated through enterprise risk management (“ERM”). ERM involves 
the identification, analysis, and management of enterprise-wide risks to aid 
the firm’s decision-making.169 In an ERM framework, all sources and effects 
of risk—including compliance risk—are addressed as part of a holistic pro-
cess.170 ERM is a top-down approach that relies on the board and senior man-
agers to create a risk culture within the organization and, therefore, ascertain 
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 167 See Simmons, supra note 7, at 1146; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and En-
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1323, 1332 (2010); Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and 
Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 581 (2008). 
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the firm’s risk appetite.171 ERM, in conjunction with compliance, establishes 
the rules that govern the organization, and the more robust the compliance 
system, the more readily motivated organizational actors can enforce that sys-
tem to ensure good governance. 
B. Firm-Specific Human Capital: The Ties That Bind 
Organic corporate governance not only needs rules, but it also requires 
organizational actors that are motivated to ensure that the appropriate govern-
ance rules are carried out. Assume a labor market that is freely competitive. 
Few transaction costs impede the movement of labor from one position to the 
other. Further assume that the knowledge employees possess is readily trans-
ferable from one employer to another. Under these conditions, when corpo-
rate governance erodes or the workplace becomes otherwise unsuitable, em-
ployees can simply exit the relationship and sell their labor elsewhere. Em-
ployees thus will not have a future stake in the enterprise, and certain actors 
in particular will lack sufficient incentive to monitor the firm for good gov-
ernance practices.172 
Firms can address this problem by encouraging investments in firm-
specific human capital. Stated most broadly, human capital is the skills, 
knowledge, and competencies possessed by a human being.173 This stock of 
knowledge includes anything that can contribute to work productivity, includ-
ing formally acquired knowledge or informally obtained skills and know-
how.174 As the developed world has increasingly evolved from a manufactur-
ing emphasis to a “knowledge society” where individual creativity and intel-
ligence have dominant value, the utilization of human capital has become 
increasingly important for employers.175 
Firm-specific human capital, by contrast, is knowledge, skills, and abili-
ties acquired by an employee whose value resides primarily with the firm in 
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 173 Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing 
Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 300 (2006). Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker 
coined the concept in 1964. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (1964) (discussing the 
concept of human capital). 
 174 Brett M. Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Systems of Human and Intellectual Capital, 93 
TEXAS L. REV. 231, 237 (2015) (citing Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital 
Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 789, 831 (2015)). 
 175 Johannes M. Pennings, Kyungmook Lee & Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Human Capital, 
Social Capital, and Firm Dissolution, 41 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 425, 425 (1998). 
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which such capital was acquired.176 For example, an employee trained in 
software uniquely customized for the employer’s business possesses firm-
specific human capital in using that software. When an automaker trains its 
employees on the technical aspects of a new vehicle model, the highly-
specific capital accumulated by these workers disappears when the model is 
removed from production.177 Firm-specific human capital can arise from 
skills gained via work teams178 or through human capital skills deployed in a 
unique combination.179 Such capital can also include a worker’s in-depth un-
derstanding of a firm’s culture, history, norms, and internal weaknesses and 
strengths.180 
What makes firm-specific human capital distinct is that it lacks value 
outside the firm in which it was developed.181 As a result, employees that ac-
quire firm-specific human capital suffer a wage penalty if they change jobs.182 
The skills for which the employee was valued and compensated for will not 
be considered valuable for the new employer. Other firms may even negative-
ly value such capital because it implies knowledge of norms and processes 
that need to be untrained. Employers may have to compensate for the em-
ployee’s loss of future return to firm-specific skills.183 A further cost is im-
posed on the employer who must endure a decrease in productivity as the new-
ly hired worker learns the new firm’s general and idiosyncratic processes.184 
Firm-specific human capital is, however, important for employers to 
maintain.185 Even extremely talented employees with unique skills may be of 
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ACAD. MGMT. REV. 376 (2012) (developing a model of human capital based advantage that ac-
counts for both supply and demand side mobility constraints). 
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limited competitive value because, in the absence of firm-specific ties, their 
easy mobility may inhibit the ability of the firm to build a sustainable com-
petitive advantage over rivals.186 Firm-specific training of employees is cost-
ly.187 When an employee leaves, that employee takes all of their firm-specific 
knowledge with him or her, and the benefits of the investment in training dis-
appear.188 These effects, combined with other frictions ranging from family 
and geographic pressures to restrictions imposed by covenants not to com-
pete,189 cumulatively result in substantial forces that discourage employees 
from leaving their jobs even when offered higher wages or better working 
conditions. 
Investments in firm-specific human capital thus form the ties that bind 
employers and employees together. Employers interested in retaining em-
ployees with valuable firm-specific knowledge may continue to invest in 
those employees to further discourage departure of that knowledge. Con-
versely, employees that remain with the firm increase their firm-specific in-
vestments. This, in turn, deepens the disincentive to depart as the cost of do-
ing so only increases, as firm-specific skills also become a larger portion of 
their total human capital. 
Employees that remain with a single employer not only have an interest 
in retaining their firm-specific utility in order to maximize their personal re-
turns, but they also have a stake in the enterprise. Voluntary turnover is not 
the only method by which firm-specific capital is lost. A company can down-
size, file for bankruptcy, or otherwise fail due to a wide range of economic, 
political, or consumer-related causes. If the employer disappears, then the 
employee’s firm-specific investments are taken away. This is no mere incon-
venience, as studies of layoffs reveal that long-tenured employees (presuma-
bly holding significant firm-specific human capital) who are laid off through 
no fault of their own, typically earn fifteen to twenty-five percent less from 
their next employer.190 It stands to reason that a long-serving employee bound 
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by firm-specific human capital, therefore, is incentivized to support the pre-
sent and future operations of the enterprise. 
Incentives to support the future success of an individual’s employer can 
manifest in the form of organizational citizenship, which deters employees 
from engaging in self-interested conduct that harms the firm. Organizational 
citizenship occurs when employees perform voluntary actions that benefit the 
organization as a whole, even when the employer has not instituted explicit 
commands or reward systems to do so.191 Organizational citizenship can ap-
pear as altruism toward the enterprise, but it also manifests in ways that rein-
force compliance with the norms, rules, and expectations of the enterprise.192 
One such manifestation is organizational loyalty, which involves supporting 
organizational objectives, defending the firm from threats, and remaining loy-
al under adverse conditions.193 Another manifestation of organizational citi-
zenship is organizational compliance, whereby an employee internalizes ad-
herence to rules and procedures, even in the absence of employer observa-
tion.194 Perhaps the most influential organizational citizenship behavior that 
promotes good governance is civic virtue. Civic virtue constitutes a loyalty by 
the employee to the organization as a whole that is expressed through en-
gagement.195 Employees with civic virtue participate actively in the govern-
ance of the firm by attending meetings, expressing viewpoints on policy, and 
debating ideas.196 They also monitor the business environment for threats to 
the organization and seek to serve the organization’s best interests, even at 
significant personal cost.197 
The result of these various incentives is a class of employees that is in-
trinsically motivated to monitor the enterprise. Whereas lower-level employ-
ees can keep track of daily operations, senior management and C-suite execu-
tives monitor organization-wide governance practices. Deviation from good 
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governance practices can have a negative impact on performance, and, in 
turn, on managers’ own returns.198 This motivation to monitor the enterprise 
arises not necessarily from altruism, but from preservation of firm-specific 
human capital and returns on firm investment. The ties that bind become the 
ties that monitor, as firm-invested employees act in their own interest to en-
sure the long-term success of the enterprise. 
C. Mutual Monitoring: The Forces That Control 
The final force that generates organic corporate governance is mutual 
monitoring. Mutual monitoring involves the reciprocal oversight of employ-
ees in an organization.199 This oversight, when backed by power to influence, 
generates control over one another’s actions. Significantly, mutual monitoring 
has the potential to mitigate the agency problem that is endemic to corpora-
tions.200 Through mutual monitoring, the interests of the superior and subor-
dinate agents are aligned. Like the above-described two forces, the alignment 
of interests that occurs during mutual monitoring is generated, not from ex-
ternal pressure or altruism, but rather as a result of self-interested motivations 
of organizational actors.201 
Although mutual monitoring can happen at various levels of the enter-
prise, this Article focuses on mutual monitoring between the CEO and imme-
diate subordinates. The CEO is the most important executive in the enterprise 
and has a profound ability to influence corporate governance.202 Although the 
CEO has substantial power, this does not mean that he or she has unfettered 
authority and autonomy. The CEO must function as one member of a top 
management team.203 The CEO must work with executives, whose responsi-
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bilities only modestly intersect with the CEO’s work.204 The CEO must regu-
larly collaborate with subordinates to do his or her work.205 Also, limiting the 
CEO’s power is an opportunity for executives to leverage processes to influ-
ence the CEO through contact with the board or fellow executives.206 In ex-
treme circumstances, an executive can bring problems within the firm to the 
attention of the media or law enforcement.207 Accordingly, the CEO must, at 
least minimally, pay attention to the demands of subordinate executives. 
Mutual monitoring can usefully be explained through a hypothetical su-
perior-subordinate relationship. Assume the presence of a firm in which one 
CEO and one manager are employed. The CEO, among many other responsi-
bilities, controls the capital investment decisions of the firm.208 CEOs may 
have selfless intentions toward the firm, either because they are entrepreneur-
ial founders, heads of family businesses,209 or are guided by personal val-
ues.210 Such CEOs will be motivated by the long-term interest of the firm.211 
In this situation, organic corporate governance merges with altruism.212 The 
CEO’s perceptual time horizon, therefore, will match the horizons of the firm 
itself or the horizons of subordinate managers, some of whom may wish to 
remain beyond the CEO’s tenure. 
Not every CEO, of course, is guided by the welfare of others. A CEO’s 
compensation, for example, is a powerful incentive to consider the well-being 
of him or herself over that of the enterprise.213 If the CEO has a long time 
horizon, a self-interested CEO will invest toward that particular horizon as it 
is in the CEO’s own best interest to do so. However, if the CEO has a short 
time horizon, either due to a plan to retire or move to another firm, the CEO 
can direct the firm’s cash flow toward his or her own advantage. This can 
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occur by diverting resources out of the firm,214 manipulating information,215 
consuming perks,216 or shirking by converting cash to leisure.217 Shareholders 
can intervene, but coordination problems are significant,218 and the available 
legal remedies are difficult to exercise. Even if shareholders are a threat to 
CEO rapacity, the CEO can buy off the shareholders by delivering just 
enough dividend payments or capital investments to keep them at bay.219 
If the selfish CEO drains the firm for personal benefit, subordinate exec-
utives will be motivated to act.220 Subordinate executives will typically have 
a longer time horizon than the CEO.221 They are motivated by the control 
rents that arise from long-term employment in the firm as well as promotion 
opportunities that will arise in the future.222 A subordinate executive who 
does not respond to a CEO’s selfish conduct will be left with an undercapital-
ized firm after the CEO’s departure. The subordinate executives, therefore, 
have multiple incentives to act to address overly self-interested CEOs. 
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Dissent is good for organizations, and can force decision makers to rely 
upon objective information over their own preferences.223 Dissent acts as a 
constraint on implementation of action that controls decision-making.224 In 
spite of these benefits, executives that openly dissent, risk their viability as a 
connected member of the enterprise as well as a potential successor to the 
CEO. Openly dissenting against a self-interested CEO is also an easy way to 
get fired.225 
In spite of these consequences, dissenting executives still maintain op-
tions for mitigating agency costs imposed by the CEO. Instead of criticizing 
the CEO, dissenting executives can respond by withdrawing effort toward the 
cash flow of the enterprise. If executives are aware that the CEO is burning 
out the firm, they have little incentive to exert present effort, as it will serve 
mainly to enrich the CEO instead of becoming future returns from which the 
executives can benefit.226 This withdrawal of effort creates a problem for the 
CEO. The CEO relies on the present effort of the executive to maximize his 
or her own immediate returns. The CEO may not be interested in the future 
but will act with a future orientation, by investing in the firm, in order to keep 
subordinates satisfied and productive. The result is a form of mutual monitor-
ing, whereby the CEO’s investment impacts the executive’s future income 
and firm-specific learning effort, and the executive’s effort, in turn, affects the 
firm’s present cash flows to the benefit of the CEO.227 When the CEO leaves 
and the executive becomes the new CEO, the incentives continue, with the 
new CEO constrained by the learning effort of its subordinates, and the cycle 
continues. This monitoring by the CEO and subordinates generates mutually 
reinforcing checks on agency costs, generated by the self-interest incentives 
of key players in the firm.228 
Like motivations produced by firm-specific human capital, mutual mon-
itoring requires a relaxed set of incentives in order to work. Mutual monitor-
ing operates as a logical consequence of the firm structure.229 Although exec-
utives must collaborate in order to succeed,230 mutual monitoring does not 
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require them to coordinate. No set policy must be established beforehand, and 
the board of directors need not intervene. Similarly, external regulation—
though sometimes necessary to enable mutual monitoring—does not neces-
sarily need to be present or effective.231 The pursuit of self-interest, typically 
seen as a deviation from governance when executives and shareholders inter-
est diverge,232 remains aligned with the interests of the firm’s residual claim-
ants. 
As noted, mutual monitoring can apply generally to superior-subordinate 
relations in the firm.233 All that is necessary to trigger monitoring incentives is 
that the employee has a stake in the future of the firm.234 This stake can be 
created through loyalty to the company or arising from a psychological con-
tract with the organization.235 This stake can also result from firm-specific 
investments that bind the employee236 or impeded employee mobility im-
posed through a covenant not to compete.237 Personal geographic preferences 
or switching costs can also generate employee incentives to monitor.238 The 
most effective monitors, and thus the greatest contributors to organic corpo-
rate governance, are employees with substantial time remaining in their ca-
reer arc.239 Such employees will be most likely to think, and also monitor, for 
the long term, and constrain the behavior of others in that time horizon. 
Enterprises can generate mutual monitoring in support of corporate gov-
ernance not only from the top-down, but also from the bottom-up. Subordi-
nates can influence the governance of superiors.240 That influence has a direct 
bearing on the superior’s conduct and the subordinate’s receipt of value. Hav-
                                                                                                                           
 231 See infra notes 275–334 and accompanying text (discussing incentives for the CLO to 
engage in mutual monitoring). 
 232 Michael J. Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311, 326 (2007). 
 233 Acharya, Myers & Rajan, supra note 172, at 702–03. 
 234 See id. at 703. 
 235 See, e.g., Julio J. Rotemberg, Altruism, Reciprocity and Cooperation in the Workplace, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 1371, 1403–04 (Serge-
Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006). 
 236 Acharya, Myers & Rajan, supra note 172, at 703. 
 237 See Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and Ethics of Re-
strictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2012). 
 238 Acharya, Myers & Rajan, supra note 172, at 703. Conversely, if job switching for employ-
ees is costless, then incentives to monitor superiors go away. 
 239 See id. at 703 n.12.  
 240 See Larry Fauver & Michael Fuerst, Better Corporate Governance Through Greater “In-
sider” Participation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 11 CORP. FIN. REV. 16, 25 
(2007) (studying employee participation on the board and concluding that “[a] bottom-up organi-
zational design that allows discussion and consensus . . . and then the communication and repre-
sentation of this information to the highest level of corporate decision makers is a critical compo-
nent of an optimal corporate governance system”). 
56 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1 
ing such influence can also increase employee loyalty because having such 
empowerment enriches the perceived quality of one’s employment.241 Em-
ployees may be more easily induced to invest in firm-specific human capi-
tal.242 Employee governance also increases overall job satisfaction, which 
enhances productivity.243 The oft-used phrase “work like you own the com-
pany” has additional substance.244 
Mutual monitoring also strengthens the argument that shareholders are 
not the only residual claimants on the firm.245 With mutual monitoring, any-
one who benefits from “rents or quasi-rents generated by the firm has [a] re-
sidual claim.”246 Whereas employees may have needed to receive perfor-
mance-based compensation247 or other corporate structure248 to establish a 
residual claim, now any employee with a future-oriented stake becomes a 
monitor and a claimant on future returns. This, in turn, further places into 
doubt the notion that the firm’s economic efficiency and maximization of 
shareholder value are uncontroversial equivalents.249 
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IV. ORGANIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER 
In order to better understand how organic corporate governance works 
in practice, we present a case study of a key actor within the organization: the 
CLO. The CLO is one of the most organizationally powerful members of top 
management.250 Doing much more than providing legal advice, corporate 
(i.e., in-house) counsel help facilitate deals, serve as an intermediary between 
management and outside counsel, manage crises, and staff the firm’s in-house 
legal department.251 The CLO, the firm’s top corporate counsel, serves no less 
than nineteen separate functions for the firm.252 These include acting as a le-
gal advisor, a member of the firm’s senior management team, the legal de-
partment’s administrator, and an agent of the corporation.253 The CLO’s pow-
er is ascendant,254 and that power gives the firm’s top attorney substantial 
ability to influence governance practices. 
The CLO is not only organizationally powerful but also holds a unique 
position. The CLO possesses a dual role as both a legal and business advi-
sor.255 Unlike other executives who pursue self-interest within the bounds of 
the organization, the CLO holds its loyalty to a single client—not its fellow 
executives but rather the corporation itself.256 Additionally, the CLO acts as a 
gatekeeper against misconduct by senior management, while also being ex-
pected to identify with the business goals of its fellow executives.257 These 
multiple and conflicting roles of the CLO offer substantial opportunities, as 
well as great challenges, to the operation of organic corporate governance in 
the firm. The following discussion explores how the CLO operationalizes 
organic corporate governance. 
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A. The Challenge of CLO Monitoring 
The relationship between the CLO and the CEO is a unique one. Com-
munications between them are potentially protected under the attorney-client 
privilege, encouraging a trusting familiarity between the executives.258 The 
need to understand the business implications of regulation, manage risk, and 
take into account legal factors in making strategic and operational decisions 
compel them to work together in a fashion that transcends traditional corpo-
rate collaboration.259 The CLO and the CEO must be able to have frank and 
honest communication, and the CLO must have a platform to speak forcefully 
on top-level corporate matters.260 
Yet despite the CLO’s considerable authority, there are forces that im-
pede the CLO’s ability to participate in organic corporate governance.261 
First, the CLO cannot withdraw effort to exert control over a selfish CEO as 
easily as other executives. When a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), for example, withdraws effort, cash flows available 
to the CEO and the firm are reduced.262 Investors, in theory, have the power 
to respond, but changes in management performance, especially in service 
industries, may be difficult to detect.263 The blunt instrument of shareholder 
litigation is ill suited to punishing an individual executive, and shareholder 
proxy procedures are arguably too slow and indirect.264 
By contrast, the withdrawal of effort by the CLO can activate visible le-
gal and regulatory problems. Lack of monitoring can trigger non-compliance 
that generates amplified sanctions for misconduct in comparison to law-
breaking firms with robust internal monitoring in place.265 Weak governance 
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structures can erode rule-following behavior and promote unethical practices 
that create unwanted public attention.266 As a visible and operative agent of 
the enterprise, the CLO serves as the ambassador for the firm’s regulatory 
posture and image,267 thereby readily recognizable and perhaps vulnerable to 
sanction. When a regulator or law enforcement body penalizes a firm for vio-
lating the law, blame is easily concentrated on those responsible for monitor-
ing, such as the CLO.268 The CLO cannot withdraw effort to curtail a selfish 
CEO without significant potential consequences to its own career and the or-
ganization as a whole. 
Second, the CLO’s future stake in the firm, a precondition to monitor-
ing,269 is not readily apparent. Unlike other executives, CLOs are significant-
ly less likely to participate in executive succession.270 The CLO is one of the 
least likely C-suite executives to become CEO. As few as five to seven per-
cent of CEOs have ever worked in legal positions before becoming the 
CEO.271 Instead, a majority of CEOs are internal appointments from opera-
tions, marketing, finance, sales, and related fields, with an average career path 
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of sixteen years within the firm.272 With fifty years old being the average age 
of a CEO’s appointment, and ascension beginning when executives are in 
their early thirties,273 this path is generally unavailable to aspiring corporate 
counsel hired from outside law firms and working mainly in the firm’s legal 
department. A CLO, whose average age is already fifty,274 that aspires to be a 
CEO will have a difficult time catching up with internally groomed competi-
tion. These forces present a challenge to effective organic corporate govern-
ance by the CLO, despite the many benefits realized by such an arrangement. 
B. Incentives for the CLO to Monitor 
In spite of the lack of succession opportunities and the negative conse-
quences of effort withdrawal, there are substantial countervailing forces that 
motivate the CLO to strengthen organic corporate governance for its own 
purposes and for the good of the enterprise. First, many CLOs increasingly 
receive performance-sensitive compensation, such as stock options, as part of 
their total compensation package.275 Such compensation aligns the recipient’s 
incentives with the incentives of investors.276 Cash starved firms can use 
stock instead of cash to pay for necessary legal services.277 When risk-seeking 
attorneys compete for legal services, a broader array of services reaches a 
larger number of corporations.278 The CLO will be rewarded when the corpo-
ration’s value (represented by its share price and market capitalization) in-
creases, and will thus lengthen its time horizon to coincide with the interests 
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of the firm.279 That lengthened horizon, in turn, motivates the CLO to curb a 
selfish CEO that might impair the receipt of future cash flow. 
Providing CLOs unrestrained, stock based, performance-sensitive com-
pensation, however, may not optimally motivate mutual monitoring. Such 
compensation, in the form of bonuses, stock options, or other methods, can 
exceed the negotiated salary CLOs receive, especially in the United States.280 
With such a powerful lure comes the ability to impair the objectivity of the 
CLO, incentivizing its interest in the firm’s equity position over the protection 
of the firm’s long-term interests.281 Corporate counsel would be nudged away 
from risk aversion and towards risk aggression, motivated by the potential 
hefty returns on their compensation, especially when advising small, high-
growth enterprises.282 Ethical professional violations can also arise from cor-
porate counsel who are compromised by such compensation.283 At worst, 
CLOs motivated by performance-based returns shed their duty to represent 
the interests of the firm and over-identify with the executives they serve.284 
This client capture285 effect subordinates the long-term needs of the enterprise 
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to the immediate goals of management. The CLO becomes just another exec-
utive, thereby losing its unique effectiveness as a gatekeeper and signaling to 
lower-ranking managers and corporate counsel that legal compliance is sub-
ordinate to maximization of personal returns. As performance sensitive com-
pensation increased for general counsel by 49.4% in 2014,286 and shows no 
signs of slowing, the potential impact of such compensation is significant. 
In order to motivate mutual monitoring, therefore, the solution may not 
be to discourage performance-based compensation altogether, but rather to 
award it in a manner that encourages long-term thinking, necessary for organ-
ic corporate governance to function. Imposing board responsibility for CLO 
compensation would keep control and influence out of management’s 
hands.287 Compensation would reward exceptional and independent legal 
work rather than rising stock prices.288 Options and awards can be based on 
time served instead of, or in conjunction with, financial performance.289 
These measures lengthen the CLO’s individual time horizon and incentivize 
the CLO toward agency checks of the CEO. Socialization effects of a CLO 
working closely with management can be re-directed toward coalition behav-
ior that monitors the CEO for rapacity rather than colludes against inves-
tors.290 This opens up the intriguing question of whether subordinate manag-
er-network effects can better prevent leader-driven opportunism in an organi-
zation.291 
A second mechanism that motivates organic corporate governance be-
havior is bonding costs, which are expenditures made by the agent that ensure 
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that the agent’s actions will not undermine the principal’s interests.292 In the 
Jensen-Meckling principal-agent relationship,293 the separation of ownership 
and control creates divergent interests between the owners of the firm and the 
managers who run daily operations.294 In addition to developing incentives 
that motivate the agent to act in the principal’s interest, principals can create 
disincentives for agents to behave.295 Monitoring costs expended by the prin-
cipal deter agents, and thus reduce agency costs, by making divergent behav-
ior more difficult to achieve and easier to detect.296 
Compared to other executives, bonding costs have different effects when 
applied to the CLO.297 CLOs are likely the only executives in the C-suite that 
shoulder these costs in their day-to-day functions.298 According to the Ameri-
can Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer is “an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility 
for the quality of justice.”299 Attorneys are professionally expected to refer to 
“moral, economic, social and political factors,” as well as legal issues, when 
applicable to advising clients.300 Lawyers also have affirmative duties to exert 
professional independence and to render candid advice even if the client does 
not want to hear it.301 This may compel corporate counsel, including the 
CLO, to render advice that is unpalatable or frustrates a company’s business 
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objectives.302 Contravention of these obligations can result in disciplinary 
action in state court and potential disbarment. 
Bonding costs also arise from specific legal obligations. CLOs, like oth-
er officers, have fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the enterprise.303 These 
duties include a duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corpo-
ration as well as a duty to monitor firm actions and investigate misconduct.304 
SEC Rule 205 requires corporate counsel that uncovers any material violation 
by an officer, director, employee, or agent to report that evidence to the firm’s 
CLO or CEO.305 The CLO has an obligation to respond to the inquiry or re-
port the evidence of the violation to the legal compliance committee.306 If the 
reporting corporate counsel concludes that the issue has not been sufficiently 
addressed, they can elevate the issue to the board of directors.307 The effect of 
these duties may not be overwhelming, but they remain backstop obligations 
to which corporate counsel must conform if the circumstances demand. 
Bonding costs also arise from preservation of reputational capital, a 
driving career concern for CLOs.308 A lawyer’s legal advice is his or her stock 
and trade, and it is difficult to show the value of that advice directly to inves-
tors. As a result, the CEO must rely significantly on perceived reputation as a 
measure of performance, which in turn serves as an assurance for the legiti-
macy of the firm’s transactions.309 CLOs build that capital through acting as a 
repeat player in numerous transactions over many years.310 Hard to gain and 
easy to lose,311 the CLO’s professional reputation acts as a signaling function 
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to the market that firm value is being adequately protected.312 CLOs must 
maintain a long time horizon, and monitor the conduct of the CEO, to sustain 
that reputational capital. CLOs lose that reputational capital, which is neces-
sary for their effectiveness as legal counsel at their current or future employ-
ers,313 if they earn a reputation of acquiescence to corporate misbehavior.314 
CLOs who lack this reputational capital, furthermore, cannot charge a premi-
um for utilizing this capital on the firm’s behalf when representing it before 
other regulators, courts, and other firms.315 Put more bluntly, “lawyers cannot 
charge a premium for providing this service if they are perceived as a shill for 
their clients.”316 
Bonding costs thus encourage CLO monitoring by placing constraints 
on the CLO’s incentive to act against the firm’s interests. This creates a feed-
back loop that drives the CLO’s value protecting function.317 When the CEO 
improperly withdraws value from the firm, the CLO is exposed to the risk of 
professional and statutory sanctions if the CLO fails to respond.318 These af-
firmative duties obligate the CLO to consider the interests of not only the 
firm, but also the legal system as a whole. The CLO is incentivized to act be-
cause of bonding costs that arise as a prerequisite to the practice of law.319 
Because these are ongoing obligations, they lengthen the decision-making 
time horizon of the CLO to coincide with that of the enterprise.320 That, in 
turn, motivates the CLO to engage in long-term planning and monitoring to 
discourage rapacity of the CEO. 
Bonding costs also act as a constraint on the CEO. The CLO is not only 
sensitive to its own reputational capital, but also serves as a guardian of the 
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corporation’s public reputation and integrity.321 When the CLO’s reputation is 
questioned, it impacts both the attorney as well as the firm.322 An impaired 
CLO reputation impedes his or her signaling function and, in turn, raises 
doubt about the quality of the firm’s corporate governance. In turn, the 
CEO—even one who is solely motivated by self-interest—is forced to moni-
tor and maintain the integrity and reputation of the CLO in order to maintain 
his or her own maximal cash flows from the firm. This shows how intra-firm 
checks on agency are reciprocal: bonding costs on the CLO generate an integ-
rity metric valued in the market, which motivates the CEO to monitor the 
CLO to ensure that the CLO’s integrity, and its associated cash flows, remains 
unchallenged. 
C. The Exercise of Organic Corporate Governance by the CLO 
A fundamental question remains: how should the CLO respond to self-
interested CEO behavior in order to facilitate mutual monitoring? The dy-
namic of mutual monitoring curbs the otherwise rapacious CEO by the sub-
ordinate executive withdrawing effort. This works because withdrawn effort 
erodes the CEO’s future cash returns, thereby forcing the CEO to lengthen his 
or her time horizon to that of the firm, or at least to the subordinate executive. 
If the CLO chooses to withdraw effort, however, this would erode the 
very organic corporate governance that the CLO seeks to create. In addition 
to the aforementioned professional and financial disincentives,323 such with-
drawal would lubricate further CEO misconduct. A CEO not investing for the 
future, either through monitoring or learning efforts, paves the way for the 
CEO to engage in even greater future rapacity.324 The selfish CEO would be 
assured that the CLO is not monitoring its conduct, and would thus be able to 
exploit the opacity of information that weak monitoring creates to obscure 
rapacity. Once that happens, the CLO, as well as other corporate executives, 
is less capable of assessing the rapacity of the CEO in the first place. This, in 
turn, can generate false negative (type II) and false positive (type I) errors,325 
with the former allowing rapacity to go unchecked and the latter unnecessari-
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ly punishing investors for unnecessary withdrawal of effort on behalf of the 
enterprise. 
So how do CLOs generate organic corporate governance? Unlike other 
executives who withdraw, CLOs can generate organic corporate governance 
by increasing their effort to respond to CEO selfishness, bringing the execu-
tive to heel, and compelling extension of the CEO’s investment time horizon 
to the CLO’s own timetable. CLOs have the capacity to increase their effort, 
and thus their effectiveness, by doing one of the things that lawyers do natu-
rally—monitoring the firm for evidence of improper conduct.326 Lawyers are 
also good at it, and there is significant empirical evidence that CLOs can, and 
do, serve as effective monitors of the firm.327 
Heightened CLO monitoring is not only important in it of itself,328 but 
due to the motivations behind the monitoring. The CLO is motivated to moni-
tor because it has a future stake in the cash flow or control rents of the 
firm.329 This future stake arises from rents or quasi-rents combined with firm-
specific investments or costs of leaving the firm.330 Required statutory man-
dates, the threat of shareholder litigation or shareholder proposals, employee 
coordination, or the pressure of the board of directors are not required to ef-
fectuate the CLO’s monitoring function. The CLO acts in order to prevent a 
reduction in its rents, and will pressure the CEO to ensure that future returns 
are forthcoming unimpeded from CEO rapacity. Thus, governance from the 
CLO arises organically as a result of the separation of ownership and control 
of the enterprise. 
The option to withdraw effort is available to the CLO but only in unusu-
al circumstances. An attorney may choose to withdraw representation as a 
response to CEO rapacity and in order to signal a corporate governance prob-
lem otherwise unobservable by external market participants, analogous to the 
“noisy withdrawal” rule proposed by the SEC.331 If severe enough, the CLO 
may exit the firm altogether, presuming that firm-specific investments and 
labor market mobility permit such exit. The CLO who exits for disclosure 
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reasons may be perceived as willing to take action to preserve his or her repu-
tational capital. A CLO voicing concerns about CEO rapacity may be subject 
to risk of discharge by the CEO, but under certain circumstances the CLO 
could respond with a lawsuit asserting a claim of retaliation under SOX or 
under common law rules related to wrongful discharge.332 Furthermore, alt-
hough removing a CLO can signal a commitment to rebuilding integrity in 
tarnished firms,333 termination of a CLO from a firm, usually perceived as 
clean, can raise questions about whether a corporate governance problem ex-
ists implicating the CEO. It may also create spillover effects and tarnish the 
reputation of the CLO, which, by mere association with the impropriety, may 
be viewed by the labor market as part of the blame.334 Consequently, the CEO 
has a disincentive to fire the CLO, and the CLO has a disincentive to leave, 
because it will impact both of their abilities to collect rents. Thus, because its 
costs are so high, withdrawal is only exercised in rare instances.  
CONCLUSION 
The role of incentives in ensuring the accountability of corporate man-
agers has been the subject of a prolonged and inconclusive debate. Regulatory 
intervention and scholarly research have failed to resolve key fundamental 
questions about how corporate governance works. This Article adds a new 
piece to the puzzle by presenting the theory of organic corporate governance 
as a new way to typologize the self-regulating conduct of corporate actors. 
If internal checks and balances are ineffective, and no substantial coali-
tion can agree on an optimal system, one could be reasonable in expecting a 
more chaotic system of corporate governance. Board membership would have 
limited value. Management would be overrun by personal greed. Sharehold-
ers would either be in a constant state of litigation or exit the market for 
greener pastures. There would be little that the U.S. market could offer as 
model of accountability and responsibility. Corporate governance would ac-
complish few of its intended goals. 
Fortunately, however, this disconcerting scenario has not come to pass. 
Although it may be useful to find answers in other corporate governance sys-
tems,335 the United States is still perceived as having one of the best corporate 
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governance systems in the world.336 There are certainly structural and regula-
tory reasons for this success, including strong legal and regulatory frame-
works337 and an inherent flexibility that facilitates adaptation of corporate 
governance practices to meet changing economic realities.338 
The model of organic corporate governance presented in this Article is a 
key component. Driven by mutually reinforcing checks on agency, employees 
of the firm engage in mutual monitoring that keeps other employees honest. A 
CEO who shirks responsibilities will destabilize the incentives of subordinate 
executives upon whom future returns depend. Subordinate executives who 
shirk responsibilities will reduce the residual value of the firm after the CEO 
departs, impairing the growth and success of their own careers. Executives 
and employees play a role in organic corporate governance, with certain ex-
ecutives—most notably, the CLO—providing an essential check on agency 
arising from their professional bonding costs and reputational effects of fail-
ing to defend value from unnecessary loss. 
Although organic corporate governance is neither exclusive to other the-
ories of corporate governance nor a panacea to the many concerns regarding 
the corporate form, it is an indispensable piece of the corporate governance 
puzzle, without which no understanding of corporate governance can be 
complete. This Article is the starting point for further discussion about the 
merits of organic corporate governance, its implications of regulatory inter-
ventions in corporate governance, and the scope of internal checks-and-
balances within the firm. 
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